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a b s t r a c t
We usemultinomial values to study the effects of the partnership formation in cooperative
games, comparing the joint effect on the involved players with the alternative alliance for-
mation. The simple game case is especially considered and the application to the Catalonia
Parliament (Legislature 2003–2007) is also studied.
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1. Introduction
The notion of coalition of partners or partnership – as it will be called here – was introduced in [16]. In [3] the signifi-
cance and scope of this concept were emphasized, first in cooperative games and later on for simple games, and the natural
way to impose partnerships in a given game by means of commitments between players was also suggested. In the present
paper we focus on a subfamily of probabilistic values calledmultinomial (probabilistic) values. These values were introduced
in reliability by Puente [20] (see also [15]) with the name of ‘‘multibinary probabilistic values’’. They were independently
defined by Carreras [4], for simple games only – i.e. as power indices – in a work on decisiveness where they were called
‘‘Banzhaf α-indices’’. Recently, Carreras and Puente [11] have given two characterizations of the multinomial values within
the class of probabilistic values: one for each value and another for the whole family.
For more than a decade, our research group has been studying semivalues, a subfamily of probabilistic values introduced
byDubey et al. [14], characterized by anonymity, and including the Shapley value as the only efficientmember. In the analysis
of certain cooperative problems we have successfully used binomial semivalues [20] that include the Banzhaf value intro-
duced by Owen [17].1 From this experience, we feel that multinomial values (n parameters, n being the number of players)
offer a deal of flexibility clearly greater than binomial semivalues (one parameter) and hence many more possibilities to
introduce additional information when evaluating a game.
The aim of this paper is the application of multinomial values to study the effects of the partnership formation. Our first
goal is to investigate how these values aremodified if several players agree to form a partnership and generalize the previous
✩ Research supported by Grant SGR 2009-01029 of the Catalonia Government (Generalitat de Catalunya) and Grant MTM 2012-34426 of the Science and
Innovation Spanish Ministry.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 938777249.
E-mail addresses: jose.miguel.gimenez@upc.edu (J.M. Giménez), m.dolors.llongueras@upc.edu (M.D. Llongueras), m.albina.puente@upc.edu
(M.A. Puente).
1 [1,6,9,10] and [12] are samples of our work in this line.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2014.01.018
0166-218X/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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results found by using binomial semivalues in [10]. Our second goal is the study of a real life political instance: the Catalonia
Parliament during the Legislature 2003–2007.
The organization of the paper is then as follows. In Section 2, aminimumof preliminaries is provided. In Section 3, general
statements for cooperative games are first given and concern the variation of the multinomial values, when a partnership
is formed, and refer to (a) inner players and (b) outside players; next, a comparison is established between the multinomial
values of the coalition as (i) a partnership and (ii) an alliance. In Section 4, we analyze partnerships in simple games: in this
case, we determine themaximum andminimumvalues of the differences found for anymultinomial value in the three cases
mentioned above and supply games where these extreme values are attained. Proofs of the statements in Sections 3 and 4
will be found in Appendices A and B, respectively. Section 5 contains the analysis of the Catalonia Parliament if a partnership
is formed. Finally, Section 6 states some conclusions.
2. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote a finite set of players. A cooperative game in N is a function v : 2N → R, which assigns a real
number v(S) to each coalition S ⊆ N and satisfies v(∅) = 0. A game v is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊂ T ⊆ N .
Player i ∈ N is a dummy in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, and null in v if, moreover, v({i}) = 0. Players
i, j ∈ N are symmetric in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}. For example, if ∅ ≠ S ⊆ N , the unanimity game
uS is defined by uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. In this monotonic game, every j ∉ S is a null player and all
members of S are symmetric players. The vector space of all games in N will be denoted as GN . Finally, every permutation θ
of N induces a linear automorphism of GN given by (θv)(S) = v(θ−1S) for all S ⊆ N and all v.
2.1. Probabilistic values
Following Weber’s [23] axiomatic definition, φ : GN → RN is a (group) probabilistic value iff it satisfies the following
properties:
(i) linearity: φ[v + v′] = φ[v] + φ[v′] and φ[λv] = λφ[v] for all v, v′ ∈ GN and λ ∈ R;
(ii) positivity2: if v is monotonic, then φ[v] ≥ 0;
(iii) dummy player property: if i ∈ N is a dummy in game v, then φi[v] = v({i}).
There is an interesting characterization of the probabilistic values, also in [23]: (a) given a set of n2n−1 weighting coeffi-
cients {piS : i ∈ N, S ⊆ N\{i}} such that

S⊆N\{i} p
i
S = 1 for each i ∈ N and piS ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ N\{i}, the expression
φi[v] =

S⊆N\{i}
piS[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] for all i ∈ N and v ∈ GN (1)
defines a probabilistic value φ on N; (b) conversely, every probabilistic value can be obtained in this way; (c) the correspon-
dence given by {piS : i ∈ N, S ⊆ N\{i}} → φ is one-to-one.
Thus, the payoff that a probabilistic value allocates to every player in any game is a weighted sum of his marginal
contributions in the game. We quote from [23]:
‘‘Let player i view his participation in a game v as consisting merely of joining some coalition S and then receiving as
a reward his marginal contribution to the coalition. If piS is the probability that he joins coalition S, then φi[v] is his
expected payoff from the game’’.
Among the probabilistic values, semivalues, introduced by Dubey et al. [14], are characterized by the anonymity property:
φθ i[θv] = φi[v] for all i ∈ N , v ∈ GN and θ , permutation on N . Alternatively, this is equivalent to saying that, if n = |N|,
there is a vector {ps}n−1s=0 such that piS = ps for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ N\{i}, where s = |S|, so that all coalitions of a given size
share a common weight that applies to all (external) players, and hence Eq. (1) reduces to
φi[v] =

S⊆N\{i}
ps[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] for all i ∈ N and v ∈ GN .
The weighting coefficients {ps}n−1s=0 of any semivalue φ satisfy therefore two characteristic conditions:
each ps ≥ 0 and
n−1
s=0

n− 1
s

ps = 1.
Well-known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value ϕ [21], for which ps = 1/n

n−1
s

, and the Banzhaf value
β [17], for which ps = 21−n. The Shapley value ϕ is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense thati∈N ϕi[v] = v(N) for
every v ∈ GN . Note that these two classical values are defined for each N .
2 In [23] this property is calledmonotonicity, but we prefer to call to it positivity as in [14].
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Finally, themultilinear extension (Owen [18]) of a game v ∈ GN is the real-valued function defined on Rn by
f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) =

S⊆N

i∈S
xi

j∈N\S
(1− xj)v(S). (2)
As is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any game v can be obtained from its multilinear extension.
Indeed, ϕ[v] can be calculated by integrating the partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the main
diagonal x1 = x2 = · · · = xn of the cube [0, 1]n [18], while the partial derivatives of that multilinear extension evaluated at
point (1/2, 1/2, . . . , 1/2) give β[v] [17].
2.2. Multinomial (probabilistic) values
The multinomial (probabilistic) values were introduced by Puente [20] (see also Freixas and Puente [15] and Carreras
and Puente [12,13]) as follows.
Definition 2.1. Set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and let p ∈ [0, 1]n, that is, p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
be given. Then the coefficients
piS =

j∈S
pj

k∈N\S
k≠i
(1− pk) for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ N\{i} (3)
(where the empty product, arising if S = ∅ or S = N\{i}, is taken to be 1) define a probabilistic value on GN that will be
called the p-multinomial value and denoted as λp. Thus,
λ
p
i [v] =

N⊇S∋i

j∈S\{i}
pj

k∈N\S
(1− pk)[v(S)− v(S\{i})] for all i ∈ N and v ∈ GN .
Although agreeing with Weber’s [23] interpretation of the weighting coefficient piS as the probability that player i joins
coalition S, we feel that the collection {piS : i ∈ N, S ⊆ N\{i}} defining a probabilistic value contains, in general, too many
parameters to be precisely determined and handled for discussion in most cases in practice. On the contrary, the weighting
coefficients {ps}n−1s=0 defining a semivalue [14], and particularly parameter q in the binomial case [20,2], may well lack the
necessary flexibility to deal with players’ behavior since, precisely, they are not able, because of their anonymity, to discrim-
inate among players. Thus, using profiles p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), which define multinomial values, appears as an intermediate
and reasonably balanced possibility between both extreme cases, since these vectors provide just one parameter per player.
Therefore we will attach to pi the meaning of generical tendency of player i to form coalitions, and will assume that pi and pj
are independent of each other whenever i ≠ j. Thus we will say that p is a (tendency) profile on N . According to Eq. (3), this
implies that coefficient piS , the probability of i to join S, will depend on the positive tendencies of the members of S to form
coalitions and also on the negative tendencies in this sense of the outside players, i.e. the members of N\(S ∪ {i}).
Remark 2.2. (a) For example, for n = 2 we have p = (p1, p2) and, if i ≠ j,
λ
p
i [v] = (1− pj)[v({i})− v(∅)] + pj[v({i, j})− v({j})].
Thus, the payoff allocated by λp to player i does not depend on pi but only on pj. If player j is not greatly interested in co-
operating, and hence pj is small, player imainly receives his individual utility whereas, otherwise, if player j is interested in
cooperating, and hence pj is great, player imainly receives his marginal contribution to the grand coalition.
(b) It is easy to check that the action of λp on an unanimity game uT is given by:
λ
p
i [uT ] =

j∈T
j≠i
pj if i ∈ T and λpi [uT ] = 0 otherwise. (4)
(c) Whenever, in particular, p1 = p2 = · · · = pn = q for some q ∈ [0, 1], coefficients piS reduce, for all i ∈ N , to
piS = ps = qs(1− q)n−s−1 for s = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1,
where s = |S| and 00 = 1 by convention in cases q = 0 and q = 1. These coefficients {ps}n−1s=0 define the q-binomial semivalue
ψq introduced by Puente [20] (see also [2]) and, obviously, λp = ψq. Of course, ψ1/2 = β , the Banzhaf value, and ψ0 and
ψ1 are, respectively, the dictatorial and themarginal values, introduced in [19] and defined by ψ0i [v] = v({i}) and ψ1i [v] =
v(N)− v(N\{i}).
(d) As is shown in [20], the multilinear extension procedure extends well to all binomial semivalues. In [20,15], the
method is also extended to anymultinomial value: ifλp is such a value and f is themultilinear extension of game v ∈ GN then
λ
p
i [v] =
∂ f
∂xi
(p1, p2, . . . , pn) for all i ∈ N. (5)
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2.3. Partnerships
Definition 2.3 ([16]). A coalition S ⊆ N is a partnership in a game v iff v(R ∪ T ) = v(R) for all T ⊂ S and all R ⊆ N\S.
A partnership is a coalition that possesses a trivial internal structure and behaves in some sense like an individual
member, since all of its strict subcoalitions are powerless (if we set R = ∅ then v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S). The formation
of a partnership suggests for the involved players a way to obtain strategic advantages. The partnership condition demands
more than an agreement to coordinate strategies, since it also forbids any deal or bargain between strict subsets and external
groups of players and restricts, then, the set of availableworths. The casewhere only one coalition S (with |S| ≥ 2) turns into
a partnership will be the only considered throughout this paper. In this case, the partnership formation is stated as follows.
Definition 2.4 ([3]). Let v be a game in N and ∅ ≠ S ⊆ N . The partnership game vS in N (where S clearly becomes a part-
nership) is defined by
vS(T ) =

v(T ) if S ⊆ T ,
v(T\S) if S ⊈ T .
It is easy to see that any two players i, j of a partnership S in a game v are symmetric in vS .
Example 2.5. Assume that three nearby towns wish to get some supply from a distribution center. By, say, geographic rea-
sons, the contract for a single town amounts to 1000 units of money but a reduced cost of 1860 units is offered by the
supplier to towns 1 and 2 for a joint contract and, similarly, a cost of 1900 units is offered to towns 1 and 3. Finally, the
supplier tenders a contract involving all towns at a price of 2790 units.
The game v, defined in N = {1, 2, 3}, that assigns to each coalition the cost savings derived from a joint contract of its
members with the supplier is given by v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and
v({1, 2}) = 140, v({1, 3}) = 100, v({2, 3}) = 0 and v(N) = 210.
If towns 2 and 3 agree to reject the possibility of a contract joining either to town 1 – it does not mean that they form a
coalition, which would give no profit to them – then this implies that coalition S = {2, 3} turns into a partnership, and a
new game vS arises. As vS = 210uN , the unanimity game on N , towns 2 and 3 are now better placed to bargain with town 1.
3. Partnership formation
The multinomial values will be used here to measure the internal and external effects of the partnership formation.
Jointly with the p-multinomial value of each player λpi [v], it will be useful to consider the (additive) p-multinomial value of
a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N in a game v, defined in a natural way by
λ
p
S [v] =

i∈S
λ
p
i [v].
3.1. Partnership game vs. original game
In particular, if v = vS , the partnership game introduced in Definition 2.4, the partnership p-multinomial value of S is
λ
p
S [vS].
For all v ∈ GN and S ⊆ N (|S| ≥ 2), we will consider the insider and outsider increments
∆Si λ
p[v] = λpi [vS] − λpi [v] for each i ∈ S,
∆Sj λ
p[v] = λpj [v] − λpj [vS] for each j ∈ N\S
and the additive increment
∆Sλ
p[v] = λpS [vS] − λpS [v] =

i∈S
∆Si λ
p[v].
As for the convenience to form partnership S, it seems important, in principle, that∆Si λ
p[v] > 0 is satisfied for every i ∈ S.
However, if at least ∆Sλp[v] > 0 holds, some kind of utility redistribution within S might be expected which satisfies all
its players. Then we can consider that the partnership formed by coalition S ⊆ N in v, which gives rise to vS , is positive if
∆Sλ
p[v] > 0, negative if ∆Sλp[v] < 0, and null if ∆Sλp[v] = 0. The next statement provides expressions for the above
increments. Note that, a priori, players j ∈ N\S are expected to be damaged by the partnership formation and hence their
increment is defined in away opposed to the definition for players i ∈ S. To ease the notation, if i ∈ T wewill use Ti for T\{i}.
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Table 1
Shapley, Banzhaf and multinomial values in v and vS , S = {1, 2}.
i ϕi[v] βi[v] λpi [v]
ϕi[vS ] βi[vS ] λpi [vS ]
1 23.50 12.75 1+p4+(1−p4)[p3+(1−p3)p2]+87p2p3p4
24.17 13.25 p2[3+ (1+ p3)(1+ p4)+ 85p3p4]
2 24.50 13.75 2+p4+(1−p4)[p3+(1−p3)p1]+87p1p3p4
24.17 13.25 p1[3+ (1+ p3)(1+ p4)+ 85p3p4]
3 25.50 14.75 3+p4+(1−p4)[p2+(1−p2)p1]+87p1p2p4
25.33 14.50 3+ p1p2(1+ 86p4)+ p4
4 26.50 15.75 4+p3+(1−p3)[p2+(1−p2)p1]+87p1p2p3
26.33 15.50 4+ p1p2(1+ 86p3)+ p3
Proposition 3.1. Let v be a game in N and p ∈ [0, 1]n be a profile on N. Then, for any S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2, and being piS =

j∈S
pj

k∈N\S
k≠i
(1− pk) for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ N\{i}
(a)∆Si λ
p[v] =

T⊇S
piTi [v(Ti)− v(T\S)] −

T∋i
S⊈T
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti)] for all i ∈ S.
(b)∆Sλp[v] =

i∈S

T⊇S
piTi [v(Ti)− v(T\S)] −

T∋i
S⊈T
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti)]

.
(c)∆Sj λ
p[v] =

T∋j
S⊈T
pjTj

v(T )− v(Tj)− v(T\S)+ v(Tj\S)

for all j ∈ N\S.
Corollary 3.2. Let v be a monotonic game in N and {i, j} = S ⊆ N. Then:
(a) ∆Sλp[v] ≥ 2(pi + pj − 1)v(N) if pi + pj < 1 and
∆Sλ
p[v] ≤ 2(pi + pj − 1)v(N) if pi + pj > 1.
(b) ∆Sλp[v] ≤ 0 if 0 ≤ pi + pj ≤ 1.
(c) ∆Sλp[v] ≥ 0 if pi + pj ≥ 1.
Remark 3.3. Corollary 3.2 states that, in monotonic games, the two-player partnership formation can be positive if, in par-
ticular, there is at least one playerwith a rather great tendency to form coalitions (pi ≥ 1/2 or pj ≥ 1/2). It also gives bounds
for the increase or decrease of the additive value of the coalition, once it becomes a partnership, in terms of pi+pj and v(N).
Example 3.4. Let v be the monotonic game in N = {1, 2, 3, 4} defined by
v({i}) = i, v({i, j}) = 1+ i+ j, v({i, j, k}) = 2+ i+ j+ k and v(N) = 100.
Assume that coalition S = {1, 2} turns into a partnership andhence a newgame vS arises.We studywhether the constitution
of the partnership is interesting for its members by using the Shapley and Banzhaf values and comparing these results with
the multinomial values (see Table 1).
(a) According to the Shapley and Banzhaf values, player 1 gets profit from the partnership formation, whereas player 2 does
not. On the other hand, players 3 and 4 are damaged by the partnership formation.
(b) According to the multinomial values, we obtain:
λ
p
1[vS] − λp1[v] = (2p2 − 1)[1+ p3 + p4(1− p3)] + p2
λ
p
2[vS] − λp2[v] = p1[1+ p3 + p4(1− p3)] − (1− p1)[2+ p3 + p4(1− p3)]
λ
p
3[v] − λp3[vS] = (1− p4)(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2)
λ
p
4[v] − λp4[vS] = (1− p3)(p1 + p2 − 2p1p2).
This shows that for all p ∈ (0, 1)4, players 3 and 4 are damaged by the partnership formation. If p2 > 1/2 player 1 gets
profit from the partnership formation whereas the result over player 2 depends on the profile p.
Example 3.5. Let v be the monotonic symmetric game in N = {1, 2, 3, 4} defined by v(S) = s(s − 1)/2 for all S ⊆ N and
let p = (2/3, 3/5, 1/3, 1/4) be the tendency profile.
We will assume that three different coalitions turn into a partnership and hence a new game vS arises. For each case we
will study whether the constitution of the partnership is interesting for its members.
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First we consider that players 1 and 2 agree to form a partnership, that is, S = {1, 2}. In this case ∆1λp[v] = 7/60 and
∆2λ
p[v] = 7/36. In accordance with Corollary 3.2,∆Sλp[v] = 14/45 ≥ 0 because p1 + p2 ≥ 1.
However, if coalition S = {3, 4} turns into a partnership, we obtain ∆3λp[v] = −19/30 and ∆4λp[v] = −19/45. In
accordance with Corollary 3.2, we have∆Sλp[v] = −19/18 ≤ 0 because p3 + p4 ≤ 1.
Finally, for S = {1, 3}, the partnership formation is globally null in the neutral case, in fact player 3 gains some amount
(17/60), which player 1 loses.
3.2. Partnership vs. alliance
A coalition structure or system of unions inN is a partition B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bm} of this set. A gamewith a coalition structure
is a pair [v; B] where v ∈ GN and B is a coalition structure in N . The quotient game vB is the game played by the unions, or,
rather, by the setM = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of their representatives, as follows:
vB(R) = v

r∈R
Br

for all R ⊆ M.
Here we shall only deal with coalition structures where just one nonempty coalition S ⊆ N (with |S| ≥ 2) forms. In
this case, it will be useful to denote as [S] such a coalition structure. Given ∅ ≠ S ⊆ N , we will denote by λp0[v[S]] the
p-multinomial value of the representative of S in the quotient game v[S] played inM = {0} ∪N\S (a non-standard notation
that seems, however, more suitable in this special case, where 0 represents S and each j ∈ N\S represents himself). In this
case p is the tendency profile induced by p in M with pi = pi for all i ∈ N\S and, among the infinite many possibilities to
define p0 in terms of p, let us suggest a few ones:
(a) p0 = mini∈S{pi}
(b) p0 = pi for some i ∈ S arbitrarily chosen
(c) p0 = 1s

i∈S pi, where s = |S|
(d) p0 = maxi∈S{pi}.
We will not discuss here which is the best option (if any). The theory developed in this paper will be of application provided
that p is a profile induced by p, no matter by which option.
We will compare λp0[v[S]]with λpS [vS], by introducing
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] = λpS [vS] − λp0[v[S]].
Given a set of players S, the following statement will be useful to determine the cases where the formation of a partnership
is more interesting than the effective constitution of a coalition in the very sense of the term (that is why we use the term
‘‘alliance’’ to distinguish it from ‘‘coalition’’, commonly understood as a mere synonymous of ‘‘subset of N ’’).
Proposition 3.6. Let v be a game in N. Then, for all S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2,
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] =


i∈S

r∈Si
pr − 1]

T⊇S

k∈T\S
pk

l∈N\T
(1− pl)[v(T )− v(T\S)

if 0 < pi ≤ 1,
−v(S) if pi = 0,
for all i ∈ N.
Corollary 3.7. Let v be a monotonic game in N and S ⊆ N be such that |S| ≥ 2. Then:
(a) If pi = 0 for all i ∈ N then∆Sλ0[vS, v[S]] < 0 unless v(S) = 0, in which case the difference vanishes.
(b) If pi = 1 for all i ∈ N then∆Sλ1[vS, v[S]] > 0 unless v(N\S) = v(N), in which case the difference vanishes.
(c) If 0 < pi < 1 for all i ∈ N then∆Sλp[vS, v[S]] > 0,= 0 or < 0 according to eitheri∈Sr∈Si pr > 1,i∈Sr∈Si pr = 1
or

i∈S

r∈Si pr < 1.
(d) If 0 < pi < 1, qM = maxr∈S pr and qm = minr∈S pr then
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] < (sqs−1M − 1)v(N) if

i∈S

r∈Si
pr > 1
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] > (sqs−1m − 1)v(N) if

i∈S

r∈Si
pr < 1.
Remark 3.8. Corollary 3.7 establishes that, in monotonic games, the partnership formation is more advantageous than the
alliance formation whenever for all i ∈ S, pi is high enough. For example, if S = {1, 2} then the difference ∆Sλp[vS, v[S]] is
positive iff p1 + p2 > 1, in particular, if p1, p2 > 1/2; and it vanishes iff p1 + p2 = 1. If S = {1, 2, 3} then the difference is
positive if pi > 1/
√
3 for all i ∈ S, and so on. In general, increasing the number of involved players requires that the tendency
to forming coalitions of all of them increases in order to getmore profit from forming a partnership than an alliance. In 3.7(d),
bounds for the difference are provided in terms of s, qM , qm and v(N).
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4. Partnerships in simple games
Simple games form an interesting class of cooperative games, not only as a test bed for many cooperative concepts but
also for the variety of their interpretations, in political science and other fields. In particular, they have been often applied
to describe and analyze collective decision-making mechanisms, and the notion of voting power has been closely attached
to them. We will specialize here on this class of games.
A game v in N is simple if it is monotonic, v(T ) = 0 or 1 for every T ⊆ N , and v(N) = 1. For example, the unanimity
game uS , for any nonempty S ⊆ N , is simple. A coalition T ⊆ N iswinning in v if v(T ) = 1 (otherwise it is called losing), and
W = W (v) denotes the set of winning coalitions in v. Due tomonotonicity, the setWm of allminimalwinning coalitions de-
terminesW and hence the game. A simple game v is aweighted majority game if there are nonnegativeweightsw1, w2, . . . ,
wn allocated to the players and a positive quota q such that
v(S) = 1 iff

i∈S
wi ≥ q.
We then write v = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]. (For additional details on simple games we refer the reader to e.g. [8,22,7] or [5].)
We denote as SGN the set of all simple games in N . Endowedwith the standard composition laws, given by (v∨v′)(S) =
max{v(S), v′(S)} and (v ∧ v′)(S) = min{v(S), v′(S)} for all S ⊆ N , it becomes a distributive lattice. This lattice remains
invariant under the partnership formation, i.e. if v ∈ SGN and ∅ ≠ S ⊆ N then vS ∈ SGN .
A power index on SGN is a map f : SGN → RN . Following Remark 2.3(c) in [4], an alternative interpretation in simple
games of the profile that defines a multinomial value is as follows. There is a status quo Q and a proposal P to modify it. The
action of the parliamentary members reduces voting for or against P . Then each pi can be viewed as the probability that player
i votes for P . Since the result of a vote is essentially equivalent to forming a coalition (the coalition of players that vote for
P), this interpretation of pi agrees with that of ‘‘tendency to form a coalition’’ that we are using in this paper.
In this section we determine the maximum and minimum values of the increments ∆Si λ
p[v] for i ∈ S, ∆Sj λp[v] for
j ∈ N\S, and∆Sλp[vS, v[S]], when v ranges SGN , as a generalization of the results obtained in [10].
Theorem 4.1. Let SGN be the set of all simple games in N, S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2 and i ∈ S. Then, for any p ∈ [0, 1]n and each
such S:
(a) The maximum value of ∆Si λ
p[v] isk∈Si pk, and it is attained for v = uS\{i}.
(b) The minimum value of ∆Si λ
p[v] isk∈Si pk − 1, and it is attained for v = u{i}.
Remark 4.2. (a) Theorem 4.1(a) states that, for any p ∈ [0, 1]n, the best profit is obtained by a null player in an oligarchy
(unanimity game) when this player is accepted to form a partnership with all the oligarchic members. Note that, therefore,
v = uS\{i} and vS = uS , so that λpi [v] = 0, λpi [vS] =

k∈Si pk and hence ∆
S
i λ
p[v] = k∈Si pk (an alternative way to obtain
the maximum value). Of course, the ‘‘best of the best’’ arises in case s = 2, where the oligarchy reduces to a dictatorship
(unanimity game u{j}) and a null player i ≠ j joins j and forms partnership S = {i, j}, with a profit pj for him. The ‘‘worst of
the best’’ occurs when S = N , that is, when the only null player in an oligarchy is admitted to form a partnership with all
the other players.
(b) Analogously, 4.1(b) says that the worst result is precisely obtained by a dictator who forms a partnership with one or
more null players. In this case, v = u{i} and vS = uS , and thus λpi [v] = 1, λpi [vS] =

k∈Si pk and ∆
S
i λ
p[v] = k∈Si pk − 1
(alternative calculus). The ‘‘worst of the worst’’ is found for S = N , that is, when all null players join the dictator, who loses
1−k∈Ni pk, and the ‘‘best of the worst’’ whenever s = 2, only one null player joins him, and the dictator’s loss is 1− pj.
Theorem 4.3. Let SGN be the set of all simple games in N, S ⊆ N with s = |S| such that 2 ≤ s < n, and j ∈ N\S. Then, for any
p ∈ [0, 1]n and each such S:
(a) The maximum value of ∆Sj λ
p[v] is 1−k∈S pk −l∈S(1− pl), and it is attained for game v defined by W = {T ⊆ N : j ∈
T , S ∩ T ≠ ∅}.
(b) The minimum value of ∆Sj λ
p[v] isl∈S(1 − pl) +k∈S pk − 1, and it is attained for game v defined by W = {T ⊆ N :
(S ∪ {j}) ∩ T ≠ ∅}.
Remark 4.4. Theorem 4.3 is a bit more complicated than Theorem 4.1 but also interesting, especially due to the games con-
cerned with the extreme values. Let us define, when ∅ ≠ R ⊆ N , the intersection game σR by σR(T ) = 1 if T ∩ R ≠ ∅ or
else σR(T ) = 0. Each σR is a simple game. In fact, σ{i} = u{i}, a dictatorship, whereas for |R| ≥ 2 we have σR = i∈R σ{i} =
i∈R u{i}, a purely individualistic game because each i ∈ R is a winner ({i} is winning but i is not a dictator) and all k ∉ R are
null players. Obviously, σR = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn]wherewi = 1 if i ∈ R,wk = 0 if k ∉ R, and q = 1.
(a) The game v where∆Sj λ
p[v] reaches its maximum value can also be described byWm = {{i, j} : i ∈ S}, so that j is the
only veto player (i.e. belongs to every winning coalition but is not a dictator), S is a blocking coalition (i.e. losing but powerful
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enough to prevent N\S to win) and the remaining players k ∉ S ∪ {j} are null. Of course, v = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn] where
wi = 1 for each i ∈ S,wj = s,wk = 0 for any k ∉ S ∪ {j}, and q = s+ 1. Besides,
v = u{j} ∧ σS = u{j} ∧

i∈S
u{i} =

i∈S
(u{j} ∧ u{i}) =

i∈S
σ{i,j}.
As vS = uS∪{j}, it is not difficult to find that λpj [v] = 1 −

l∈S(1 − pl) and λpj [vS] =

k∈S pk whence ∆
S
j λ
p[v] = 1 −
l∈S(1− pl)−

k∈S pk (alternative but not easier computation of the maximum).
(b) The game v where ∆Sj λ
p[v] reaches its minimum value can also be described by Wm = {{k} : k ∈ S ∪ {j}}. It is an
intersection game, since v = σS∪{j}, and the first paragraph of this remark applies to it. In particular, v = k∈S∪{j} u{k}. As
vS = uS ∨ u{j}, here we have
λ
p
j [v] =

l∈S
(1− pl),
λ
p
j [vS] = 1−

k∈S
pk,
∆Sj λ
p[v] =

l∈S
(1− pl)+

k∈S
pk − 1
(again, an alternative but not easier computation of the minimum).
Theorem 4.5. Let SGN be the set of all simple games in N and S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2. Then, for each such S:
(a) If

i∈S

r∈Si pr > 1 then the maximum value of ∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] isi∈Sr∈Si pr − 1 > 0, and it is attained for v = uS ;
the minimum value is 0 and it is attained in any game v where all members of S are null players.
(b) If

i∈S

r∈Si pr < 1 then the minimum value of ∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] isi∈Sr∈Si pr − 1 < 0, and it is attained for v = uS ; the
maximum value is 0 and it is attained in any game v where all members of S are null players.
Remark 4.6. (a) The extreme values of∆Sλp[vS, v[S]] are quite obvious in three cases that have been omitted in Theorem4.5.
Indeed, from Corollary 3.7 it follows that:
• For pi = 0 for all i ∈ N , the maximum is 0 and it is attained in all games where S ∉ W , whereas the minimum is−1 and
it is attained in all games where S ∈ W .
• Instead, for pi = 1 for all i ∈ N , the maximum is s − 1 and it is attained in all games where N\S ∉ W , whereas the
minimum is 0 and it is attained in all games where N\S ∈ W .
• Finally, ifi∈Sr∈Si pr = 1 then∆Sλp[vS, v[S]] = 0 for all S ⊆ N with s = |S| ≥ 2 and all v.
(b) For the remaining values of pi, Theorem 4.5 points out that the greatest difference (in both senses) between the result
of forming a partnership and that of forming an alliance is found in the oligarchy of the involved coalition. Note that if v = uS
then vS = uS and v[S] = u{0}, so that λpS [vS] =

i∈S

r∈Si pr , λ
p
0[v[S]] = 1 and therefore∆Sλp[vS, v[S]] =

i∈S

r∈Si pr − 1
(an alternative way to derive the extreme no-null value in both cases).
5. The Catalonia Parliament, Legislature 2003–2007
In this section, we shall apply multinomial values to the analysis of a political structure.
5.1. The political framework
We consider here the Catalonia Parliament in Legislature 2003–2006, prematurely finished.3
Let us briefly describe the political positions of the agents in this game:
1. CiU (Convergència i Unió), Catalan nationalist middle-of-the-road coalition of two federated parties.
2. PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), moderate left-wing socialist party, federated to the Partido Socialista Obrero
Español.
3. ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), radical Catalan nationalist left-wing party.
4. PPC (Partit Popular de Catalunya), conservative party, Catalan delegation of the Partido Popular.
5. ICV (Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds), coalition of Catalan eurocommunist parties, federated to Izquierda Unida, and
ecologist groups (‘‘Verds’’).
In Catalonia, politics is based on twomain axes: the classical left-to-right axis and an orthogonal axis going from Spanish
centralism to Catalanism (Catalan nationalism) (see Fig. 1). In 2003, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a radical
3 The analysis remains valid for Legislature 2006–2010: in spite of the modification of the seat distribution issued from the elections held in November
1, 2006, the strategic possibilities are exactly the same.
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Fig. 1. Position of parties in a two-dimensional ideological space.
nationalist and left-wing party, was faced with the dilemma of choosing between either a Catalanist majority coalition with
Convergència i Unió (CiU) or a left-wingmajority coalition with the Partitp dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) and Iniciativa
per Catalunya-Verds (ICV). Thus, the role of ERC in this scenario would be crucial. Nevertheless, a previous partnership
formation concerning PSC and ICV would have been only natural by ideological reasons.
5.2. Initial evaluation
Under the standard absolute majority rule, and assuming voting discipline within parties, the structure of this parlia-
mentary body can be represented by the weighted majority game
v ≡ [68; 46, 42, 23, 15, 9].
Therefore, the strategic situation is given by
Wm(v) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}},
so that players 2 and 3 on one hand, and 4 and 5 on the other, are symmetric in v.
The introduction of tendency profiles will break these symmetries. Nevertheless, a structural symmetry still exists, be-
tween λp2[v] and λp3[v] on one hand and λp4[v] and λp5[v] on the other, since e.g. λp3[v] follows from λp2[v] by replacing p3 with
p2. This is due to the symmetrical positions of each pair of players in the game, which translates to themultilinear extension.
The calculation of λp[v] derives for each player:
λ
p
1[v] = p2 + p3 − p2p3(1+ p4 + p5 − p4p5)+ p4p5(1− p2 − p3 + p2p3),
λ
p
2[v] = p1 + p3(p4 + p5)− p1p3(1+ p4 + p5 − p4p5)− p4p5(p1 + p3 − p1p3),
λ
p
3[v] = p1 + p2(p4 + p5)− p1p2(1+ p4 + p5 − p4p5)− p4p5(p1 + p2 − p1p2),
λ
p
4[v] = p2p3(1− p1 − p5 + p1p5)+ p1p5(1− p2 − p3 + p2p3),
λ
p
5[v] = p2p3(1− p1 − p4 + p1p4)+ p1p4(1− p2 − p3 + p2p3).
5.3. To be or not to be (in a previous partnership)
We wish to investigate here the effects of PSC and ICV turning into a partnership by applying the multinomial values
λp to games v and vS , where S = {2, 5}. Following [3], we get vS from v by inserting, in each minimal winning coalition
T ∈ Wm containing somemember of S, the remaining members of S (if any), and removing, finally, the members of the new
family that are not minimal. This gives rise to
(W S)m = {{1, 2, 5}, {1, 3}, {2, 3, 5}}.
All multinomial values applied in this section have been computed using derivations of the multilinear extension
technique (5) that can be found in [15]. The results of applying multinomial values to the two games mentioned before
are given in Table 2.
Now, we look at Table 2, where the effects of S = {2, 5} turning into a partnership are described. By comparing λpi [v]
and λpi [vS]we obtain:
• PSC and ICV become symmetric players in the partnership game vS . The insider increments are:
∆S2λ
p[v] = −p1(1− p3)(1− p5)− p4p3(1− p1)− p4p5(2p1p3 − p1 − p3),
∆S5λ
p[v] = p1p2(1− p3)+ p4p2p3 + p4p1(p2 + p3 − 2p2p3 − 1).
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Table 2
Multinomial values in v and vS , S = {2, 5}.
1. CiU λp1[v] = p2 + p3 − p2p3(1+ p4 + p5 − p4p5)+ p4p5(1− p2 − p3 + p2p3)
λ
p
1[vS ] = p3 + p2p5(1− 2p3)
2. PSC λp2[v] = p1+p3(p4+p5)−p1p3(1+p4+p5−p4p5)−p4p5(p1+p3−p1p3)
λ
p
2[vS ] = p5(p1 + p3 − 2p1p3)
3. ERC λp3[v] = p1+p2(p4+p5)−p1p2(1+p4+p5−p4p5)−p4p5(p1+p2−p1p2)
λ
p
3[vS ] = p1 + p2p5(1− 2p1)
4. PPC λp4[v] = p2p3(1− p1 − p5 + p1p5)+ p1p5(1− p2 − p3 + p2p3)
λ
p
4[vS ] = 0
5. ICV λp5[v] = p2p3(1− p1 − p4 + p1p4)+ p1p4(1− p2 − p3 + p2p3)
λ
p
5[vS ] = p2(p1 + p3 − 2p1p3)
It is difficult, in principle, to say anything of interest about the expressions for ∆Si λ
p[v]. Fortunately, a simplification
can be reasonably achieved. Indeed, the almost isolated political position of PPC (party 4) with regard to the remaining
parties strongly suggests taking p4 ≈ 0, which will make things easier:
∆S2λ
p[v] ≈ −p1(1− p3)(1− p5),
∆S5λ
p[v] ≈ p1p2(1− p3).
In this case the insider increments become negative and positive respectively for all p ∈ (0, 1)5 with p4 ≈ 0. That is, ICV
gets profit from the partnership formation whereas PSC is always damaged by it. In accordance with Corollary 3.2, the
additive increment∆Sλp[v] is nonnegative if and only if p2 + p5 ≥ 1.• CiU and ERC become symmetric players once the partnership is formed (game vS). The outsider increments are:
∆S1λ
p[v] = p2(1− p3)(1− p5)− p4p2p3 + p4p5(1− p2 − p3 + 2p2p3),
∆S3λ
p[v] = −p1p2(1− p5)+ p4p2(1− p1)+ p4p5(2p1p2 − p1 − p2).
The above assumption p4 ≈ 0 will reduce to:
∆S1λ
p[v] ≈ p2(1− p3)(1− p5),
∆S3λ
p[v] ≈ −p1p2(1− p5).
This shows that for all p ∈ (0, 1)5 with p4 ≈ 0, CiU is damaged by the partnership formation whereas ERC gets profit
from it.
• PPC is fully damaged by the partnership formation since it becomes a null player in vS .
5.4. Partnership vs. alliance
Assume that players 2 and 5 form an alliance S = {2, 5}. We study if the formation of the previous partnership is more
interesting than the effective constitution of this alliance.
The quotient game v[S] played inM = {0} ∪ N\S, where 0 represents S and each j ∈ N\S represents himself, is
v[S] = [68; 51, 46, 23, 15, 9].
The set of winning coalitions is
Wm

v[S]
 = {{0, 1}, {0, 3}, {1, 3}}.
We denote λp0[v[S]] the p-multinomial value of S in the quotient game v[S] and λpS [vS] the partnership p-multinomial value
of S. Notice that profile p does not appear in λp0[v[S]] because the payoffs to the members of a union depend only on the
tendencies of the remaining unions, that, in this case, reduce to a singleton {j} and pj = pj, for j ∈ N\S. We obtain
λ
p
0[v[S]] = p1 + p3 − 2p1p3
λ
p
S [vS] = (p1 + p3 − 2p1p3)(p2 + p5)
λ
p
S [vS] − λp0[v[S]] = (p1 + p3 − 2p1p3)(p2 + p5 − 1).
According to Corollary 3.7 the partnership formation is more advantageous than the alliance formation if p2 + p5 > 1.
6. Conclusions
Wehave usedmultinomial values tomeasure the effects of the partnership formation in a game as a generalization of the
study done by using binomial semivalues in [10], whosemonoparametric condition implies a limited capability of analysis of
such situations. These values form an n-parametric family depending on p ∈ [0, 1]n on which they offer a new view. Profile
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p has been given a probabilistic interpretation and supplies information not included in the characteristic function of the
game. By using multinomial values we get a much more precise approach to the influence of players’ different personalities
on the partnership formation problem. The reader is referred to the example of Catalonia Parliament (Section 5) for a detailed
analysis. This influence, and hence the increase of strategic options for the different parties, cannot be discovered bymerely
using the traditional and more rigid values: it arises from the possibility to attach a parameter to each player, which is just
the characteristic of the multinomial values. The fact that they are based on tendency profiles provide new tools to assume
a wide variety of situations from players’ personality when playing a given game.
The partnership formation involve any group of players in any game and it gives rise to a new game. We have compared
the effects of the partnership formation, with regard to the original game, in the following situations (a) for the members of
the partnership, the insider increment, (b) for the remaining players, the outsider increment, and (c) a comparison for all the
partnership members, the additive value, in the partnership game and its value as a player in the quotient game that arises
from the alliance formation is also useful to decide which strategy is better. Moreover, in the case of simple games we also
determine the maximum and minimum values for the differences found in cases (a)–(c), and provide games where these
extreme values are attained.
Future work might concern (a) the study of mixed situations between coalition structures and partnerships formations
by extending the p-multinomial values to games with a coalition structure (the coalitional p-multinomial value [13]) in a
similar way than the symmetric binomial coalitional semivalue [1,10,12] extends the binomial semivalue in these games
(we are already working on it). They apply to games with a coalition structure by combining the Shapley value and the
multinomial values. Here we first apply the p-multibinary probabilistic value λp in the quotient game to get a payoff for
each union; next, we use within each union the Shapley value, to share the payoff efficiently by applying it to a reduced
game played in that union. (b) The study of two or more coalitions forming partnerships.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. (a) Let i ∈ S. From Definitions 2.1 and 2.4,
λ
p
i [vS] =

T∋i
piTi [vS(T )− vS(Ti)].
Therefore
λ
p
i [vS] =

T⊇S
piTi [vS(T )− vS(Ti)] +

T∋i
S⊈T
piTi [vS(T )− vS(Ti)]
=

T⊇S
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti\S)] +

T∋i
S⊈T
pTi [v(T\S)− v(Ti\S)] =

T⊇S
piTi [v(T )− v(T\S)] (6)
because i ∈ S and Ti\S = T\S. Then
λ
p
i [vS] − λpi [v] =

T⊇S
piTi [v(T )− v(T\S)] −

T∋i
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti)]
=

T⊇S
piTi [v(T )− v(T\S)] −

T⊇S
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti)] −

T∋i
S⊈T
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti)].
Hence
λ
p
i [vS] − λpi [v] =

T⊇S
piTi [v(Ti)− v(T\S)] −

T∋i
S⊈T
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti)].
(b) It readily follows from (a).
(c) Let j ∈ N\S. Then
λ
p
j [v] − λpj [vS] =

T∋j
pjTj [v(T )− v(Tj)] −

T∋j
pjTj [vS(T )− vS(Tj)].
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Writing vS in terms of v and splitting again both sums according to either S ⊆ T or S ⊈ T ,
λ
p
j [v] − λpj [vS] =

T∋j
S⊆T
pjTj [v(T )− v(Tj)] +

T∋j
S⊈T
pjTj [v(T )− v(Tj)]
−

T∋j
S⊆T
pjTj [v(T )− v(Tj)] −

T∋j
S⊈T
pjTj [v(T\S)− v(Tj\S)].
Therefore
λ
p
j [v] − λpj [vS] =

T∋j
S⊈T
pjTj [v(T )− v(Tj)− v(T\S)+ v(Tj\S)]. 
Proof of Corollary 3.2. (a) |S| = 2 and hence, for each i ∈ S,
{Ti : i ∈ T , S ⊈ T } = {T\S : S ⊆ T }.
Indeed,
∆Sλ
p[v] =

i∈S

T⊇S
piTi [v(Ti)− v(T\S)] −

T∋i
S⊈T
piTi [v(T )− v(Ti)]

.
Besides, if S = {i, j} then
{Ti : S ⊆ T } = {T : j ∈ T , S ⊈ T } and {Tj : S ⊆ T } = {T : i ∈ T , S ⊈ T }.
Thus
∆Sλ
p[v] =

i∈S

T⊇S
(piTi − pS\{i}T\S )[v(Ti)− v(T\S)]
= (pi + pj − 1)

T⊇S

l∈Tij
pl ·

l∈N\T
(1− pl)[v(Ti)+ v(Tj)− 2v(T\S)], (7)
The inequalities follow from formula (7) and the fact that
T⊇S

k∈Tij
pk ·

l∈N\T
(1− pl) = 1.
(b) and (c) follow from formula (7) which evidences the sign of ∆Sλp[v] as every pi ranges [0, 1], provided that v is
monotonic. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6. By applying Definition 2.1 to the quotient game v[S] we obtain
λ
p
0[v[S]] =

R⊆M
0∈R
p0R[v[S](R)− v[S](R\{0})] =

T⊆N
S⊆T

k∈T\S
pk ·

l∈N\T
(1− pl)[v(T )− v(T\S)].
Taking into account the definition of quotient game and using formula (6) from the proof of Proposition 3.1(a),
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] =

i∈S

T⊇S
piTi [v(T )− v(T\S)] −

T⊇S

k∈T\S
pk ·

l∈N\T
(1− pl)[v(T )− v(T\S)]
=

T⊇S

i∈S
piTi −

k∈T\S
pk ·

l∈N\T
(1− pl)

v(T )− v(T\S)

if pi > 0 for all i ∈ N . Instead, in case pi = 0, for all i ∈ N , we get
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] = −v(S). 
Proof of Corollary 3.7. Items (a) and (b) are obvious because the expression of∆Sλp[vS, v[S]] obtained in Proposition 3.6 is
−v(S) if pi = 0 for all i ∈ N and (s− 1)[v(N)− v(N\S)] if pi = 1 for all i ∈ N . As for (c), the monotonicity of v reduces the
sign question to factor

i∈S

r∈Si pr − 1. Finally, if qM = maxr∈S pr and qm = minr∈S pr , (d) follows from the inequalities:
qs−1m − 1 ≤

r∈Si
pr − 1 ≤ qs−1M − 1, and v(S ∪ R)− v(R) ≤ v(S ∪ R) ≤ v(N)
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and the relation
T⊇S

k∈T\S
pk ·

l∈N\T
(1− pl) = 1. 
Appendix B. Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1. From Proposition 3.1(a) it is easy to see that, if v is simple and i ∈ S, then
∆Si λ
p[v] = λpi [vS] − λpi [v] =

T∈W1
piTi −

T∈W2
piTi ,
where
W1 = {T ∈ W : S ⊆ T , Ti ∈ W , T\S ∉ W } and W2 = {T ∈ W : i ∈ T , S ⊈ T , Ti ∉ W }.
From this we have, for any v ∈ SGN ,
−

T∈W2
piTi ≤ ∆Si λp[v] ≤

T∈W1
piTi .
(a) The maximumwill be reached whenW1 is formed by the maximum number of coalitions, i.e.W1 = {T ⊆ N : S ⊆ T },
and W2 = ∅. To this end, let us take v = uS\{i}. Then W = {T ⊆ N : S\{i} ⊆ T } and, indeed, W1 = {T ⊆ N : S ⊆ T } and
W2 = ∅ as desired. Hence
max
v∈SGN
∆Si λ
p[v] =

S⊆T⊆N
piTi =

k∈Si
pk.
(b) In this case, the minimum will be reached when W1 = ∅ and W2 is formed by the maximum number of coalitions,
i.e.W2 = {T ⊆ N : i ∈ T , S ⊈ T }. Now let us take v = u{i}. ThenW = {T ⊆ N : i ∈ T } and, in effect,W1 = ∅ andW2 is as
desired. Here
min
v∈SGN
∆Si λ
p[v] = −

T∈W2
piTi =

k∈Si
pk − 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3. From Proposition 3.1(c) it follows that, if v is simple and j ∈ N\S, then
∆Sj λ
p[v] = λpj [v] − λpj [vS] =

T∈W : j∈T ,
S⊈T , S∩T≠∅
piTi =

T∈W3
piTi −

T∈W4
piTi ,
where
W3 = {T ∈ W : j ∈ T , S ⊈ T , S ∩ T ≠ ∅, Tj ∉ W , T\S ∉ W } and
W4 = {T ∈ W : j ∈ T , S ⊈ T , S ∩ T ≠ ∅, Tj ∈ W , T\S ∈ W , Tj\S ∉ W },
because, if j ∈ T and S ⊈ T but T ∉ W or S ∩ T = ∅, then the term of T in the original expression of∆Sj λp[v] vanishes. Then,
for any v ∈ SGN ,
−

T∈W4
piTi ≤ ∆Sj λp[v] ≤

T∈W3
piTi .
(a) The maximum will be reached when W3 is formed by the maximum number of coalitions, i.e. W3 = {T ⊆ N : j ∈
T , S ⊈ T , S ∩ T ≠ ∅}, andW4 = ∅. To this end, let us take v defined byW = {T ⊆ N : j ∈ T , S ∩ T ≠ ∅}. It is not difficult
to check thatW3 is as desired andW4 = ∅. Hence
max
v∈SGN
∆Sj λ
p[v] =

R⊆N\{S∪j}
pjR ·

∅≠R⊂S
pjR = 1− pj∅ − pjS = 1−

k∈S
(1− pk)−

k∈S
pk.
(b) In this case, the minimum will be reached when W3 = ∅ and W4 is formed by the maximum number of coalitions,
i.e.W4 = {T ⊆ N : j ∈ T , S ⊈ T , S ∩ T ≠ ∅}. Now let us take v defined byW = {T ⊆ N : (S ∪ {j}) ∩ T ≠ ∅}. Again, one
easily verifies thatW3 = ∅ andW4 is as desired. Here
min
v∈SGN
∆Sj λ
p = −

R⊆N\{S∪j}
pjR ·

∅≠R⊂S
pjR = pj∅ + pjS − 1 =

k∈S
(1− pk)+

k∈S
pk − 1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.5. If pi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ N and v is simple then, from Proposition 3.6,
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] =

i∈S

r∈Si
pr − 1

T⊇S

k∈T\S
pk

l∈N\T
(1− pl)[v(T )− v(T\S)].
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(a) According to Corollary 3.7(c), if

i∈S

r∈Si pr > 1 this expression is nonnegative, and will attain its maximum value
whenever all T ⊇ S satisfy T ∈ W and T\S ∉ W , that is, in the unanimity game v = uS . This value is
∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] =

i∈S

r∈Si
pr − 1 > 0.
As

i∈S

r∈Si pr > 1, the onlyway the expression of∆Sλ
p[vS, v[S]] vanishes is by forcing the sum to be empty. This happens
in any game where, for all T ∈ W such that S ⊆ T , we have T\S ∈ W , and this means that all members of S are null players
in this game.
(b) The proof follows the same guidelines as in (a). 
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